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Abstract 
The Judicature Modernisation Bill 2013 re-enacts the operative provisions of the 
Judicature Amendment Act 1972. This paper analyses the re-enacted provisions, 
concluding that the reform will be largely successful relative to a goal of “non-
substantive reform”. However, this paper argues that there were significant defects 
in the legislative process leading to reform, especially in terms of parliamentary 
scrutiny of judicial review. In a context of a fused executive-legislative branch of 
government, it is highly inappropriate to legislate for judicial review without 
adequate consideration of the effects on judicial review powers and processes. This 
paper argues that judicial review procedure should not be contained in statute in 
order to prevent undue legislative interference. 
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“Quality can be an elusive idea but it does not, like beauty, 
lie in the eye of the beholder.”              
Geoffrey Palmer QC1 
 
I Introduction 
The general idea of our constitution is that Parliament has full power to make 
any law that it deems necessary to make.2 This paper’s central thesis is that, even if 
this is true, our elected legislature should not exercise that power to legislate for 
judicial review. The main reason for this is as simple as it is, frankly, basic: the 
fusion of executive and legislature is so advanced in New Zealand that politically 
ceding the power to regulate judicial review to Parliament is to cede it also to the 
executive. That the executive could direct how a judge should determine the legality 
of its actions is undesirable in a system where the rule of law is the “guiding light 
of constitutional propriety.”3 
The closely related question of whose role it is to administer and define judicial 
review in New Zealand is of substantial significance. I will explain why I am deeply 
sceptical of parliamentary interference in judicial review with close reference to the 
omnibus Judicature Modernisation Bill 2013. The Bill is an excellent example of 
an inexpert legislature wasting an opportunity to make good on known issues. It is 
not enough to cite the Bill’s moderate successes in the unambitious goal of non-
substantive reform as justification for that lapse. There was highly inadequate 
                                                          
1  Geoffrey Palmer “Law Making in New Zealand: Is There A Better Way?” (2014) 22 Wai L 
Rev 1, also (2015) 5 VUWLRP 87/2015, at 3.  
2  Constitution Act 1986, s 15(1); Jackson v Attorney-General [2005] UKHL 56 at [102] per 
Lord Steyn; see generally Sian Elias, Chief Justice of New Zealand “Another Spin on the 
Merry-Go-Round” (Address to the Institute for Comparative and International Law, 
University of Melbourne, Australia, 19 March 2003) at 4. 
3  Matthew SR Palmer “Assessing the Strength of the Rule of Law in New Zealand” (paper 
presented to the New Zealand Centre for Public Law Conference on “Unearthing New 
Zealand’s Constitutional Traditions”, Wellington, August 2013) at 1; but for a good working 
definition of the rule of law see Matthew SR Palmer “New Zealand Constitutional Culture” 
(2007) 22 NZULR 565 at 587. 
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legislative scrutiny in the process of passing the Judicature Modernisation Bill. This 
raises questions of whether Parliament has enough control over the content of 
legislation, such that the legislation it passes can be seen as passed by Parliament 
at all.4 My criticisms are rooted in a commitment to the rule of law, which I and 
others believe to be underappreciated in New Zealand.5 As such, the Judicature 
Modernisation Bill is a timely example of why Parliament needs to tread carefully 
when legislating for constitutional essentials. 
I will go on to discuss the nature of judicial review as a common law power. 
Because judicial review’s origins lie in the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court, 
there is a basic tension with any view that argues Parliament is lawfully sovereign. 
It is not enough to sidestep this conflict as resoluble with a deft touch of statutory 
interpretation.6 Even if Parliament was a perfect legislator, it makes little sense to 
speak of a legislative intent to enable judicial review. For the most part, Parliament 
has not turned its mind to judicial review process, and arguments for implied 
intention mask the historical nature of review as a tool fashioned by courts. The 
implications of these insights for statutory amendments to review process is that 
Parliament is, essentially, meddling. Accordingly, Parliament needs to rethink the 
role it plays in establishing judicial review process in order to better protect the 
power of review. Whether that role is the same but subject to more cautious 
processes, or a refusal to use legislative power, is perhaps not too important. Either 
would be a better protection for judicial review than undue interference. 
This paper comes from a generally instrumental perspective. In my view, the 
main value of public law is its role as moderator of public power in a broad sense. 
But public power depends on its perceived legitimacy, which in turn depends on 
exercised authority not exceeding proper bounds. Therefore, in making my 
argument I am conscious the judiciary cannot overreach if it is to retain its respect.7 
                                                          
4  Palmer, above n 1, at 21. 
5  See for example: Palmer, “New Zealand Constitutional Culture”, above n 3, at 589; Claudia 
Geiringer “Mr Bulwark and the Protection of Human Rights” (inaugural professorial lecture, 
Victoria University of Wellington, 29 April 2014). 
6  TRS Allan Constitutional Justice: A Liberal Theory of the Rule of Law (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2001) at 210. 
7  GDS Taylor Judicial Review (Butterworths, Wellington, 1991) at [1.01]. 
6               Proceed, with Caution: Law Reform, Judicial Review and the Judicature Modernisation Bill 
However, the same must be said of Parliament. The first principle of our 
constitution is not that Parliament is sovereign, it is that “no principle should be 
over-stressed or pushed to its limits.”8  That insight is part of what animates the 
principles of comity, and it is not a one-way street. Parliament may be our supreme 
law-making power, but that is different from saying it is the only one that must be 
respected. Current parliamentary attitudes to judicial review err too closely to the 
latter view. 
II Background to the Judicature Modernisation Bill 
The Judicature Modernisation Bill 2013 entered the Parliamentary agenda when 
it was introduced to the House on 27 November 2013.9 The Bill had been a part of 
an intensive study at the Law Commission since the 2010 request of then-Minister 
of Justice Simon Power. The purpose of the review was quite straightforward: 
modernisation and reorganisation of the Judicature Act 1908, not reform as such. 
Substantive change or revisiting of “major matters of policy” in the law of the courts 
and civil procedure was explicitly not within the terms of reference.10 
Rather than addressing judicial review, most of the Judicature Modernisation 
Bill concerns enactments required following repeal of the Judicature Act 1908. 
These enactments notably include the establishment of a unitary District Court, 
increased provision for the online publishing of judgments, and the potential for a 
commercial list in the High Court. By contrast, the terms of reference contained in 
Appendix 1 only minimally touch on judicial review.11 The District Court structure 
is irrelevant to judicial review. Online publishing of judgments, a commercial list 
in the High Court, and a program of modernising language are at best only 
                                                          
8  Ferdinand Mount The British Constitution Now: Recovery or Decline? (Heinemann, London, 
1992) at 81 as quoted in Elias, above n 2, at 4. 
9  The Bill can be found online, along with all submissions and evidence, at the Parliamentary 
website: see House of Representatives “Judicature Modernisation Bill” (18 February 2015) 
<www.parliament.nz>; see generally Judicature Modernisation Bill 2013 (178), especially 
part three.  
10  Law Commission Review of the Judicature Act 1908: Towards a New Courts Act (NZLC 
R126, 2012), at iv. 
11  At Appendix 1. 
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tangentially relevant to judicial review. Therefore, the Judicature Modernisation 
Bill has rather little to do with judicial review overall. 
The only reason judicial review came up for study at all by the Commission was 
an unhappy legislative abnormality. Statutory rules for judicial review procedure 
are contained in the Judicature Amendment Act 1972 which peculiarly stands apart 
from the principal 1908 Act while also being read as part of it.12 Because the 
proposed reform of the courts includes a repeal of the 1908 Act, it would “orphan” 
the Judicature Amendment Act.13 The Commission was concerned that without re-
enactment it would cease to be a cogent legislative enactment. This shows, 
however, that the inclusion of judicial review in the Judicature Modernisation Bill 
is little more than a consequential amendment stemming from unrelated legislative 
agenda.  
The terms of reference for the Commission’s review contained one initial 
suggestion that related to judicial review: a new “Civil Procedure Act”.14 This 
would have been, presumably, a one-stop statute for matters of procedure including 
judicial review. That degree of codification was not preferred by the Commission, 
who opted for a new stand-alone “Judicial Review (Statutory Powers) Bill” 
instead.15 As it happens, this is more or less the path taken by the incumbent 
government; the Judicature Modernisation Bill will split into a variety of Bills at 
the third reading stage, one of which will become the new Judicial Review 
Procedure Act.16 The text of the Act will comprise what is currently part three of 
the Bill. 
General consensus appears to be that the Bill presents a suitable opportunity to 
modernise the language of the Judicature Amendment Act. 17  Changing the 
language of an enactment without changing its operation as law is always risky, but 
it appears to have generally succeeded in this case. At a minimum, it can be fairly 
                                                          
12  Judicature Amendment Act 1972, short title. 
13  Law Commission, above n 10, at 8. 
14  At Appendix 1, para (b).  
15  At Appendix 3. 
16  (18 February 2015) 703 NZPD 1725. 
17  Law Commission, above n 10, at 4; see also Appendix 3. 
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described as the universal intention of all parties––nobody is attempting a back-
door reform. Yet, worthy of note is the caveat deployed by the Commission that the 
Judicature Modernisation Bill generally is not a “pure” consolidation where the 
substantive law could be certified as not changing at all.18 
III What Reform? 
I turn now to part three of the Judicature Modernisation Bill and analyse some 
of the major points of contention in the statutory language. Although the substantive 
operation of the law as relates to judicial review procedure is not meant to change, 
the way it looks certainly will. There is one exception: rights of appeal against 
interlocutory orders are curtailed to an uncertain extent. This paper focuses on 
major areas of debate to illustrate that general picture.  
A Troubleshooting the Idea of “Non-Substantive Reform” Per Se 
To begin, cl 423 of the Bill explicitly provides an uncontroversial and well-
settled purpose for the proposed stand-alone Act:19 
As it appears here, cl 423 is a powerful statement of purpose that should correct any 
especially technical reading of the Judicature Modernisation Bill that may arise. It 
channels the essence of the Judicature Amendment Act as a mostly-procedural 
enactment.20 For the most part, only minor language changes have been made to it, 
to reflect modern drafting practice. Even where the language may seem expansively 
different, the effect in terms of substantive law change is likely to be construed quite 
narrowly to respect this purpose section. As such, it is a useful statutory aid.  
                                                          
18  At iv–v. 
19  Judicature Modernisation Bill (178-2), cl 423. 
20  Taylor, above n 7, at [2.02]; Law Commission, above n 10, at [2.1]. 
423 Purpose of this Part 
(1) The purpose of this Part is to re-enact Part 1 of the Judicature 
Amendment Act 1972, which sets out procedural provisions for the 
judicial review of— 
(a) the exercise of a statutory power; 
(b) the failure to exercise a statutory power; [and] 
(c) the proposed or purported exercise of a statutory power. 
(2) The reorganisation in this Part of those provisions, and the changes 
made to their style and language, are not intended to alter the 
interpretation or effect of those provisions as they appeared in the 
Judicature Amendment Act 1972. 
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Defining non-substantive reform is conceptually difficult. It requires the law 
reformer to oxymoronically intend to both do something new and achieve nothing 
new by the same action. Even if it is possible, as it was with the re-enactment of the 
Judicature Amendment Act, there is a constant pressure to check each provision 
rigidly to ensure there is no real way it can be misinterpreted. The burden on 
statutory language becomes even harsher than usual because there is always the 
background question of whether Parliament intended a given section to be a 
substantive reform despite the purpose clause. Such a general clause is unlikely to 
be determinative on its own. That is, the competing presumption that each language 
change is intended to have legal effect is not put aside, but modified. Because of 
this, clearly articulating the goals of the reform and also establishing the means of 
achieving it in a way which recognises that goal is sometimes prohibitively difficult. 
Even where it is done perfectly––and the Bill is far from perfect––the issue of 
vagueness is unresolved. For this reason it is sometimes simply better to start afresh 
rather than re-enact the old law.21 
For example, what happens when the ordinary meaning of the new Act is at 
odds with the old interpretation? Statutory interpretation is always a matter of 
judicial construction. 22  It is sometimes open to a judge to undermine actual 
Parliamentary intention in the interpretation of any offending section of the new 
Act, provided that is permitted by the text. 23  That is doubly true when other 
important values are at stake.24 Premonition of future court rulings is not an exact 
science; for present purposes it is sufficient to note that an enterprising lawyer on 
the right facts may be able to abuse a loophole in this or similar purpose sections if 
they find a suitable problem in the statutory language. Importantly, that is a 
prospective vulnerability in a purpose clause constructed in the manner of cl 423 
and a powerful reason for why they should be avoided in general. 
                                                          
21  Palmer, above n 1, at 4. 
22  Allan, above n 6, at 210. 
23  Interpretation Act 1999, s 5. See also: R v Pora [2001] 2 NZLR 37 (CA); R v Poumako [2000] 
2 NZLR 695 (CA), at 702. 
24  See, for example, judicial approaches to s 6 of the Bill of Rights Act: Hansen v R [2007] 
NZSC 58, [2007] 3 NZLR 1, at [13]–[18] per Elias CJ. 
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Further, the purpose clause is limited to changes of language in the provisions 
that are re-enacted. That is, the language of provisions in the Judicature 
Modernisation Bill are not intended to alter the interpretations of those provisions 
as they appeared in the Judicature Amendment Act. The omitting of a clause is 
hardly comparable to a change in style or organisation of language. An omitted 
provision is not a ‘reorganised provision in the Bill’ in other than a sparse legalistic 
sense. It is a stretch to claim the lack of statutory language relating to, for example, 
the s 4(2A) proviso can be read as having the same effect as the positive statutory 
language that it had in the old Act. In falling outside that purpose clause, each 
omitted section has the possibility, depending on its content, to change the 
substantive law. 
Purpose clauses in the manner of cl 423 will never be a complete solution to 
problems of statutory drafting. The overall result is that when done badly the effects 
of so-called non-substantive or technical reform can be too unclear to be workable, 
especially when reliant on these clauses. This is not merely about being technically 
correct. That a proviso is unnecessary or omitted provisions are included elsewhere 
is rather beside the point. This incompleteness of coverage in the purpose clause 
demonstrates a defect in the Bill’s law reform process per se.  
B Notable Changes in Drafting 
Provisions proclaiming the best of intentions cannot overcome defects in 
legislative drafting, which are more likely to occur the more this method of reform 
is attempted. Something more is required from our legislators. For the most part, 
fortunately, there are few issues in the modernisation and redrafting of the 
Judicature Amendment Act. 
Because judicial review is intended to be an expeditious review of the exercise 
of public power, the courts’ continued power of review is central. That power was 
bounded and given alternative form by the statutory procedure in s 4 of the 
Judicature Amendment Act.25  Although the section does not confer powers of 
review, its importance is demonstrated by the fact that most applications for judicial 
                                                          
25  Judicature Amendment Act 1972, s 4. 
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review are done through the Act’s process.26 Section 4 provided for the possibility 
of relief that an applicant would be entitled to under proceedings in the nature of a 
writ of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, or a declaration or injunction.27 It also 
provided that such remedies were discretionary,28 that one ‘remedy’ was to have 
the decision-maker reconsider the decision reviewed,29 and that in such cases the 
decision-maker would have to consider such things as the court directed in coming 
to a new decision.30 Arguably, s 4 is the most important thing to get right in the Bill. 
These provisions are mostly retained in cls 436–438 of the Bill. Clause 436 
deals primarily with availability of remedies.31 It preserves court power to set aside 
an unauthorised use of discretion. The rule that an absence of a duty to act judicially 
will not bar an application for review is retained.32 Omission of the proviso in s 
4(2A) of the Judicature Amendment Act, that this reversal “shall not be construed 
as enlarging of modifying” the grounds for review, is not problematic. 33  The 
Commission’s view that it is difficult to construe the section as enlarging or 
modifying the grounds for review seems well-founded.34 Clause 437 effectively re-
enacts s 4(5)–(5C) as they relate to the direction of the decision-maker subject to 
review proceedings. Clause 438 preserves the discretionary nature of relief as it 
exists under the Judicature Amendment Act. 35  Though the reorganisation of 
language is occasionally quite extreme, read in the light of the purpose clause it is 
unlikely that powers of the court contained in s 4 will change. 
                                                          
26  Law Commission, above n 10, at [2.1]; see also Dean Knight “Privately Public” (2013) 24 
PLR 108, for discussion of the view that the Judicature Amendment Act is a “source” of 
review jurisdiction. 
27  Judicature Amendment Act 1972, s 4(1). 
28  Sections 4(2), (3)–(4). 
29  Sections 4(5)–(5C). 
30  Section 4(6). 
31  Judicature Modernisation Bill 2013 (178), cl 436(1)–(2); to trace each provision as it appears 
in the Judicature Amendment Act 1972 into the Bill, see Appendix 1 of this paper. 
32  Judicature Modernisation Bill 2013 (178), cl 436(3). 
33  Judicature Amendment Act 1972, s 4(2A). 
34  Law Commission, above n 10, at [2.44]. 
35  Judicature Modernisation Bill 2013 (178), cl 438; compare Judicature Amendment Act 1972, 
s 4(3)–(4). 
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Section 9 of the Judicature Amendment Act relating to review procedure is re-
enacted within cls 428–430.36 Section 9 generally dealt with such things as the 
naming of parties––for example, whether a judge is to be named as a party––and 
requirements of statements of claim and defence.37 Much of it is simply written in 
modern drafting language. The most notable change is the omission of s 9(2), which 
provided a statement of claim should state the factual basis of the claim, the grounds 
of relief, and relief sought. Because the High Court Rules already require this for 
all civil and interlocutory applications, omission of s 9(2) is likely unproblematic 
and without meaningful consequence.38 
Other changes in statutory language are similarly vivid but equally likely to be 
toothless. By way of illustrative example, cl 427(1) re-enacts the substance of s 3A 
of the Judicature Amendment Act as it relates to the High Court’s (in-)ability to 
review the Employment Court through judicial review under the statutory process.39 
The obvious addition of specific sections in the Employment Relations Act into cl 
427(2) of the Bill is for the worthwhile avoidance of doubt, yet seemingly redundant 
given the operation of cl 427(1). Much of the obvious differences in language are 
in this vein. 
C Rights of Appeal Curtailed? 
There is, naturally, a caveat. Not every change made is harmless. The purpose 
clause is not all-inclusive; in fact, on closer inspection it appears to be something 
more like a sieve. It only covers “reorganisation in this Part of those provisions, and 
the changes made to their style and language”.40 It does not cover any other change 
arising from other parts of the Bill, whether deliberate or accidental. Accordingly, 
                                                          
36  Judicature Amendment Act 1972, s 9; compare Judicature Modernisation Bill 2013 (178), cls 
428–430. 
37  Judicature Amendment Act 1972, s 9. 
38  High Court Rules, rr 4.1, 5.26–5.27; Law Commission, above n 10, at [2.35]. 
39  Judicature Modernisation Bill 2013 (178), cl 427; compare Judicature Amendment Act 1972, 
s 3A. 
40  Judicature Modernisation Bill 2013 (178), cl 423(1). 
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it seems there will be an (unintended) amendment to appeal rights, of uncertain 
extent, in direct contravention of the purpose clause.41 Clause 440 provides:42 
By including a reference to cl 57, cl 440 of the Bill actually mirrors the Judicature 
Amendment Act’s language.43 Any reform arises from changes in cl 57 in part one 
of the Bill. Ministry of Justice officials advised the Committee that, as the change 
arises from a change outside of part three, there is no clash with the protections 
afforded by cl 423.44 
At introduction, cl 57(3) provided that the Court of Appeal would have no 
jurisdiction to hear appeals against interlocutory orders of the High Court in respect 
of any civil proceeding such as judicial review, unless leave was first granted.45 
Section 66 of the Judicature Act, which cl 57(3) replaces, does not impose a 
requirement to seek leave before an appeal of interlocutory orders. 46  This 
inconsistency has been patched at the select committee stage; the relevant part of cl 
57 now reads:47 
                                                          
41  New Zealand Bar Association “Submission to the Justice and Electoral Committee on the 
Judicature Modernisation Bill 2013” at [113]–[117]. 
42  Judicature Modernisation Bill 2013 (178), cl 440. 
43  See Judicature Amendment Act 1972, s 11. 
44  Report of the Ministry of Justice to the Justice and Electoral Committee (April 2014) at [77]–
[78]. 
45  Judicature Modernisation Bill 2013 (178-1), cl 57(3).  
46  Judicature Act 1908, s 66. 
47  Judicature Modernisation Bill 2013 (178-2), cl 57(2A)–(3). 
440 Appeals 
(1) Any party who is dissatisfied with any interlocutory or final order 
made in respect of an application may appeal to the Court of Appeal 
in accordance with section 57 of the Judicature Modernisation Act 
2013. 
 
57 
… 
Jurisdiction 
(2A) No appeal, except an appeal under subsection (3), lies from any order 
or decision of the High Court made on an interlocutory application in 
respect of any civil proceeding unless leave to appeal to the Court of 
Appeal is given by the High Court on application within 20 working 
days after the date of that order or decision or within any further time 
that the High Court may allow. 
(3) Any party to any proceedings may appeal without leave to the Court 
of Appeal against any order or decision of the High Court–– 
(a) striking out or dismissing the whole or part of a proceeding, 
claim, or defence; or 
(b) granting summary judgment. 
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The new cl 57 makes changes in the substantive law of judicial review 
procedure, despite being amended to account for interlocutory appeals where they 
would strike out, dismiss, or grant summary judgment in respect of a claim.48 Given 
that judicial review tends to be a quick process ordinarily, the exceptions under cl 
57(3) may have limited effect. Where there is a live issue that needs resolution, an 
injunction to maintain the position of the parties will not be able to be appealed. 
Depending on time-frames involved, this may have the effect of practically 
resolving the core of a complaint. Such changes to appeal rights ought to be 
avoided.49 Nonetheless, this is a substantive change to judicial review procedure. 
Whilst the Ministry of Justice was correct to identify that this was not a change 
contemplated by part three of the Bill, their assurances are less than comforting. 
The object of the Bill, as it relates to judicial review, was to avoid substantive 
reform of any kind. This is substantive reform. Therefore, the object of the Bill has 
been demonstrably compromised. Additionally, side-stepping consequential reform 
by saying it is the result of a reference to a reformed provision in the proposed 
Senior Courts Bill does not inspire full confidence that the entire Judicature 
Modernisation Bill has been vetted properly to ensure minimal substantive reform 
will occur. The exact sources of any changes are not relevant, because the public 
has been assured that there is no material change in substance. The ordinary 
observer, even a technically skilled one, does not have the resources to confidently 
second-guess such claims. It is important that their faith is not abused. 
Nonetheless, other than cl 57, there is no likely legal change to judicial review 
processes and powers. I have surveyed here only some of the more obvious changes 
in statutory language for reasons of space, but the pattern in these changes is clear.  
The law of judicial review procedure remains substantively the same as it was under 
the Judicature Amendment Act. The exception is cl 57, the effect of which is 
uncertain. To the extent the statutory language is distinct it is highly likely to be 
caught within the expansive purpose clause, preventing change in the law. Although 
                                                          
48  Judicature Modernisation Bill 2013 (178-2), cl 57(3). 
49  Supreme Court, Court of Appeal, and High Court “Submission to the Justice and Electoral 
Committee on the Judicature Modernisation Bill 2013” at [27]–[28]. 
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I have shown the purpose clause to be defective, the courts will be unlikely to 
willingly curtail judicial review. That judicial attitude will have to be enough. 
IV Proper Reform Process 
Saying the Judicature Modernisation Bill has more or less succeeded in a 
modest project of non-substantive, or purely visual, reform should not be construed 
as an endorsement of the attempt. I now turn to the process by which the Bill has 
moved through the legislature. Although Parliament can in theory make any law it 
pleases, not all processes are created equal. 
The ten indicia identified by Geiringer, Higbee, and McLeay provide a good 
basis for appropriate reform process.50 These were: public and open pre-legislative 
policy processes; adequate opportunities for scrutiny; adequate means of public 
participation; transparency of process; high quality drafting; caution, when 
legislating for the basics; preferring stable processes ordinarily; legislating in ways 
that foster respect for Parliament; allowing the Government to implement its policy 
program; and finally that urgency should be available when genuinely necessary. 
The ten indicia are more widely applicable that the use of urgency that the authors 
confined themselves to. They can be fairly extended to include the legislative 
process in general in any open, free and democratic society such as New Zealand. 
For present purposes, scrutiny is probably the most important paradigm they refer 
to. I will focus on scrutiny because it is closely connected with quality drafting, and 
because both together demonstrate appropriate levels of caution. They are all 
obviously interrelated. 
Under that framework the process used to reform part three of the Judicature 
Modernisation Bill is deficient for a bill of such constitutional significance in at 
least two ways. First, the idea of “non-substantive reform” and over-reliance on 
legislative intentions reduce the probability of clear and reliable reform, 
undermining legislative caution and stable processes. Secondly, as an omnibus bill 
the possibility for real scrutiny of the Bill’s contents was worryingly inadequate. A 
                                                          
50  See generally Claudia Geiringer, Polly Higbee and Elizabeth McLeay What's the Hurry? 
Urgency in the New Zealand Legislative Process 1987-2010 (Victoria University Press, 
Wellington, 2011).  
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lack of parliamentary examination undermined the criteria of transparency and 
scrutiny. Additionally, the attempt at so-called “non-substantive reform” is usually 
a waste of an opportunity to address already identified proposals for reform. These 
together suggest that Parliament should tread carefully when reforming or adopting 
constitutional basics in general, and judicial review in particular. Judicial review is 
far too important to get wrong. 
A Value of Good Scrutiny in Legislative Process 
For legislation, “[q]uality can be an elusive idea but it does not, like beauty, lie 
in the eye of the beholder.”51 It is important to distinguish good or desirable law 
from effective law in order to emphasise that scrutiny is more about the latter. 
Effective reform processes will maximise the probability of producing effective 
law. By contrast, there will be a degree of agnosticism about whether the results of 
a reform are worthwhile or desirable. That is for legislators to judge and not the 
legal process itself.  
The Judicature Modernisation Bill, as it relates to judicial review at least, is an 
example of mixed results in the reform process. Although it had reasonable pre-
legislative scrutiny––largely defining the parameters of the current reform––this 
was never second-guessed by Members of Parliament. That politicians should 
occasionally trust the experts is proper. The issue is rather more that there was no 
opportunity for the question of trust to arise, because the process of the Judicature 
Modernisation Bill as an omnibus bill radically limited parliamentary 
consideration.  
Examination of legislation is a crucial part of any legislative process. It has 
essentially two main purposes. Firstly, scrutiny is essential to the public reform of 
the law and enhances its legitimacy as law. Adversely, an obvious lack of scrutiny 
undermines the public’s trust in the law and the institution of Parliament 
generally.52 Whilst important in its own right, public confidence in legislation is not 
strictly the subject of this paper. But the second reason scrutiny is important is more 
relevant; a good legislative process is one of the most obvious ways to rectify 
                                                          
51  Palmer, above n 1, at 3. 
52  Geiringer, Higbee and McLeay, above n 50, at 2–3. 
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defects in legislative drafting. Since none can second-guess Parliament’s enacted 
law the law must be adequate before it is passed.53 
Sufficient analysis before and during the legislative process will lead to 
technically more effective enactments. Public analysis rectifies defects that one 
person’s poor vision can hide. The observable nature of a suitably scrutinised 
procedure encourages legal actors to provide reasoning for their actions, and fixes 
the debate closely to the purpose of the attempted reform. Parliamentary debate 
done well reduces indifference to a law, requiring the members of Parliament to 
pick one side based on the evidence available. Although this can lead to hasty 
decisions, it nonetheless trends towards more consideration of a proposed law. 
Scrutiny enhances the public transparency of reform, enabling critique and warning, 
and in doing so inhibits the possibility for indifference to result in arbitrary or 
technically deficient legislative enactments. With more consideration, higher 
quality law should result. 
That said, there is a degree of political incentive on the part of the executive to 
avoid scrutiny in Parliament.54 The extent to which the adoption of Mixed-Member 
Proportional elections has ameliorated this is open to debate. Because the executive 
still largely controls the legislative agenda this has the de facto effect of partially 
reducing legislative functions to the executive––that is, to Cabinet Ministers in their 
role as members of Parliament. In that perhaps limited sense, some laws that 
Parliament passes may not be, realistically, thought of as Parliament’s law at all.55 
In such cases, the role of the House is abridged as endorsement and legitimisation, 
a “rubber stamp” of the government policy process.56 In my view, the size of the 
Judicature Modernisation Bill makes it one such bill. Generally, that the executive 
has political incentives to subsume and interfere with Parliamentary scrutiny but is 
less consistently able to do so means that it is hard to assign blame for inadequate 
scrutiny to either branch of government. But it must be asked to what extent 
                                                          
53  At 18. 
54  Jo Dinsdale “Law making under MMP: the legislative process and the new standing orders” 
(LLM Research Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 1996) at 62. 
55  At 62. 
56  Keith Jackson The Dilemma of Parliament (Allen and Unwin, Wellington, 1987) at 38, as 
cited in Dinsdale, above n 54, at 10. 
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Parliament really has a role in making the law it passes.57 This is why scrutiny is so 
important during the pre-legislative process. 
B Considering the Judicature Modernisation Bill’s Process 
A brief review of Hansard suggests that the process of reforming judicial review 
by an omnibus bill has, so far, been superficial on the part of Members of 
Parliament. The Judicature Modernisation Bill is yet to go to the Committee of the 
Whole House, and languishes on the Order Paper; it has not been fully debated. In 
the first and second readings, judicial review was mentioned a total of seven times.58 
Only two could be fairly described as substantive mentions, meaning that the 
comment went beyond pointing out that part three of the Bill relates to judicial 
review. An Opposition member made the point in the second reading that 
unrepresented litigants take up a substantial amount of judicial time in review 
proceedings by not knowing their rights.59 A Government member made the point 
shortly afterwards that judicial review is sometimes used by applicants to widen the 
realm of legal issues the court can consider in a case.60 Whilst neither point is 
without value, they are hardly incisive commentary. 
Against this sparse consideration, it is somewhat appalling to see what was 
genuinely debated. Members contested the Bill’s definite size––that is, the number 
of pages––no less than three separate times. The size of the bill was mentioned nine 
times in the first reading and eighteen times in the second. Some members did not 
even address the subject matter of the Bill: one member talked about ultra-fast 
broadband instead.61 There were jibes at the age of other members. Two members 
admitted to not reading the full text of the Bill.62 While members are not required 
to read every bill they pass, something more is needed from Parliament when it 
passes constitutional legislation. Judicial review was simply not salient in the 
                                                          
57  Palmer, above n 1, at 21. 
58  See generally: first reading, (5 December 2013) 695 NZPD 15299–15314; second reading, 
(18 February 2015) 703 NZPD 1725–1749. 
59  (18 February 2015) 703 NZPD 1733, per David Parker MP. 
60  At 1745, per David Bennett MP. 
61  (5 December 2013) 695 NZPD 15313–15314, per Clare Curran MP. 
62  (18 February 2015) 703 NZPD 1729, per Jacqui Dean MP; at 1733, per Jonathan Naylor MP. 
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parliamentary awareness. In light of this, can we really “have faith in the group 
mind”?63 
Rather, other things were the subject of parliamentary time in the readings and 
at select committee. Twenty-five written submissions were received by the 
Committee.64 Specialist submissions of various judicial benches and commercial 
law firms accounted for eleven submissions. 65  These generally dealt with the 
specific matters affecting the court in question or were general commentary by 
section on the bill. Of the remaining fourteen, seven dealt with the rights of victims 
of crime.66 Four of that seven clearly wanted more punitive treatment of offenders 
or greater judicial accountability to prevent a perceived judicial coddling of 
criminals, a topic relatively unrelated to the structure and powers of courts. Two of 
the fourteen dealt with the award of damages for copyright violation.67 One related 
to what seems to be an undefined personal grievance.68 The remaining four dealt 
with genuine constitutional matters, such as the omission of s 3 of the Supreme 
Court Act 2003.69 Only one submission dealt with judicial review primarily.70 It 
would be interesting to see what effect the omnibus nature of the Bill has had on 
these patterns, and whether more submissions on judicial review would have been 
made on a stand-alone Bill. My suspicion is that there would be. 
Amendments made at select committee were presented without comment, and 
judicial review went (substantively) unmentioned in the Committee’s report.71 
                                                          
63  At 1742, per Kennedy Graham MP.  
64  Report of the Ministry of Justice to the Justice and Electoral Committee, above n 44, at [3]. 
65  All submissions can be found at House of Representatives “Judicature Modernisation Bill” 
(18 February 2015) <www.parliament.nz>. The eleven ‘specialist’ submissions include: the 
New Zealand Law Society, the New Zealand Bar Association, Buddle Findlay, Bell Gully, 
Arbitrators’ and Mediators’ Institute of New Zealand, the Royal Federation of New Zealand 
Justices Association, and representatives of the judges of the Environment Court, 
Employment Court, Māori Land Court, District Courts, and the senior Courts.                                                                          
66  Ruth Money, Rethinking Crime and Punishment, Red Raincoat Trust, Harry Young, Dirk 
Anderson, Brendon Cullen, Sensible Sentencing Trust. 
67  Recorded Music New Zealand, Copyright Licensing New Zealand. 
68  Milton Pedley. 
69  Jack Hodder QC, Human Rights Commission, Richard Cornes, Dean Knight. 
70  Dean Knight. 
71  Judicature Modernisation Bill (178-2) (select committee report).  
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Given lack of coverage in the submissions, that is unsurprising. As the mind of the 
Committee was generally directed elsewhere, the process of the Judicature 
Modernisation Bill as an omnibus bill is questionable. But it is too harsh to conclude 
there was no scrutiny. For example, the scarce submissions on judicial review 
eventuated a change to the definition of “person” in part three to bring it more in 
line with the Judicature Amendment Act 1977’s definition.72 The problems with 
appeals have been attempted to be solved, so those changes to judicial review are 
at least deliberate. Besides this, there were a number of technical changes that 
Parliamentary Counsel determined were necessary. 
Such generality of submissions is insufficient overall when legislating for 
judicial review. The process the Bill has gone through seems automatic and 
superficial, focussing instead on headline political issues like criminal sentencing 
and online courts. That this criticism is not new is additionally discouraging.73 
There is limited basis for concluding that scrutiny of the Bill’s effects on judicial 
review were adequate.74 
C Improving Reform Processes 
The nature of the Judicature Modernisation Bill and its attempted non-reform 
appear to be intended to be a temporary measure designed to prolong the status quo 
until a proper review of judicial review is undertaken.75 This is not an excuse for 
ineffective scrutinising of the Bill. Fortunately, improving reform procedures is a 
rather straightforward affair.  
In general, constitutional reformers should avoid omnibus bills. Omnibus bills 
have much the same issues as bills under urgency in that they stifle time to debate, 
                                                          
72  Drafting notes by Parliamentary Counsel Office on part three of the Judicature 
Modernisation Bill (version 19.1, 15 May 2014, available online); see also Judicature 
Amendment Act 1977, s 10. 
73  Palmer, above n 1, at 20–21, especially the criticisms relating to the Justice and Electoral 
Committee’s report on the Judicature Modernisation Bill. 
74  Giving reasons in Parliamentary Counsel Office drafting notes would be immeasurable help 
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without them. 
75  Law Commission, above n 10, at [2.4]–[2.19]. 
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when time is needed to digest all the ramifications of a proposed bill.76 For example, 
one member remarked when he took a split call that he had fifty seconds for every 
two hundred pages of the Bill.77 A hurried and opaque legislative procedure inhibits 
scrutiny,78 which is precisely why omnibus bills are generally reserved for non-
contentious amendments.79 The problem is that constitutional issues are relatively 
contentious by virtue of their fundamental nature. That is, simple constitutional 
changes still reflect complex and contestable value judgments. When reform is done 
by omnibus bill, even a well-drafted constitutional bill will become lost in the other 
parts of the bill, as has happened here with the Judicature Modernisation Bill. Stand-
alone bills are better because they improve the transparency and publicness of a bill. 
They invite better examination. 
Good scrutiny will never overcome the problems of ill-considered legislation. 
That is, New Zealand has a problem with over-legislating.80 We tend to legislate in 
large statutes; yet we will tinker without principles around the edges when we do 
not like the results. 81  We also tend to legislate for things that do not require 
legislation at all. 82  These habits contribute significantly to the Parliamentary 
workload––the ‘legislative bottle-neck’––incentivising cursory analysis in order to 
facilitate the appearance of getting things done. 83  A degree of caution about 
codification and statutory construction is necessary, so as to not make regrettable 
mistakes that will need repair later. It is also better not to legislate at all if it is not 
needed. Getting it right will free up Parliamentary time for more important and 
relevant matters, and provide more resources to use on legislative scrutiny. 
                                                          
76  Geiringer, Higbee and McLeay, above n 50, at 142. 
77  (18 February 2015) 703 NZPD 1743, per Phil Goff MP. 
78  Philip A Joseph Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (4th ed, Brookers, 
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(John McIndoe, Dunedin, 1992) at 121, cited in Dinsdale, above n 54, at 19. 
80  Palmer, above n 1, at 5. 
81  At 3–4. 
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22               Proceed, with Caution: Law Reform, Judicial Review and the Judicature Modernisation Bill 
Certainly, no reform is likely to be fully scrutinised to the utmost extent. 
Effective scrutiny is more of an ideal towards which we aim. However, that success 
is an ideal does not justify continual failure; reform can be done better if done in 
public and for the right reasons. 
V Parliament Should Tread Carefully When Using Legislative Power 
Need for adequate scrutiny is in the foreground of any structural reform of the 
New Zealand state. Analysis on legislative process above was defined by the simple 
idea that the boundaries of the public sphere and public power should be set by a 
clear and accessible process. The constitution is a public document that should not 
be altered inadvertently, capriciously, or in secret.84 Similarly, to aid quality reform 
Parliament should show deference to the courts on such matters as judicial review 
and judicial independence. This is not a challenge to the claimed full powers of 
Parliament to make law, but an argument for additional respect or deference to 
matters relating to the common law powers of the courts. It is animated by a desire 
to secure independent administration of the law of judicial review, and the spirit of 
comity. 
The fundamental basis of the power of Parliament is found in the principles of 
democracy and the rule of law. Many theories of the rule of law explicitly hold that, 
ideally, the law governs all equally and independently of their role in society.85 
Similarly, democracy is often argued to decentralise political power.86 Both of these 
separately require that the state is subject to law at the suit of a private citizen, which 
is only achievable when a judge can rule against the government “without fear or 
favour”.87 Making application of the law independent from its administration or 
creation is the very first condition of a system that functionally follows either 
                                                          
84  See Joseph Raz The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1979) at chapter 11, where he discusses the instrumental value of law. 
85  For example, see: Palmer, “New Zealand Constitutional Culture”, above n 3, at 587; Brian 
Tamanaha On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2004) at 114; Lord Bingham “The Rule of Law” (Sixth Sir David Williams 
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principle.88 Independence of the law is instrumentally valuable, in order to limit the 
arbitrary usage of state power. 
Ministers, and the bodies accountable to them, take decisions according to the 
law as defined and interpreted by the courts. Accordingly, courts have a role as 
scrutineer of government power. 89  In a political climate still dedicated to the 
concept of two main parties, I am sceptical that the Mixed-Member Proportional 
electoral system has properly limited executive influence of the House. As 
Ministers hold office by virtue of collectively having confidence of the House,90 
and control the legislative agenda,91 the executive retains much of the substantial 
power over law that it possessed under the old system. Reduced separation is not 
conducive to good process; as one of the mechanisms to define due process, judicial 
review is an important safeguard in the New Zealand context.  
Still, there is no need to insist on the full tripartite separation of powers that is 
endured by certain foreign states, provided that the courts remain suitably 
independent. As Montesquieu puts it, there is no liberty “if the power of judging is 
not separate from legislative power and from executive power.”92 Yet even a brief 
look at modern Westminster democracies indicates that a politically responsive 
legislature may be fused with the executive with only minor problems. This is 
merely Bagehot’s efficient secret in action.93 It goes too far to describe separation 
of powers as a “constitutional myth” in New Zealand.94  
The sometimes underappreciated consequence of fusion, however, is to 
radicalise the importance of judicial independence. It is improper that a fused 
legislature-executive takes too much interest in regulating the judiciary’s inner 
                                                          
88  See generally Palmer, “Assessing the Strength of the Rule of Law in New Zealand”, above n 
3, at 6–7. 
89  Richard Mulgan Politics in New Zealand (3rd ed, Auckland University Press, Auckland, 
2004) at 70. 
90  Cabinet Office Cabinet Manual 2008 at [6.37]–[6.42]. 
91  Joseph, above n 78, at [11.6.3]. 
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93  Bagehot The English Constitution (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001) at 8–9. 
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workings. Since not much thought is given to separation of the branches of 
government, legislative-executive caution becomes in a certain respect a 
democratic imperative. This is necessary to protect against centralised power. 
It also must be questioned what role Parliament actually can play in the law of 
judicial review. Besides the instrumental argument for caution advanced above, 
there is also a question over the actual legal legitimacy of Parliamentary 
involvement. It is widely agreed that there is no statute conferring the power of 
review; even the Judicature Act is only a process statute.95 Without a clear statutory 
culprit, only limited guidance is given to the courts in determining the proper extent 
of review. Such historical ambiguity about the source of review powers suggests 
that a degree of parliamentary co-operation typified through appropriate levels of 
scrutiny and consultation is desirable, if not obligatory. 
Debate between the ultra vires models and common law illegality models of 
review is unresolved.96 It is not possible, nor necessary, to undertake a suitably 
thorough review of the common law illegality and ultra vires models of review in 
this paper. Nonetheless, such debate is not merely academic. The strong corollary 
of an ultra vires interpretation is that the proper role of review, besides to prevent 
material errors of law, is to ensure that discretion of administrators is exercised in 
accordance with Parliament’s manifest or presumed intention. Yet upholding 
Parliament’s intention is not the same as upholding fundamental principles like the 
rule of law. Given the instrumental objection above, that Parliament is controlled 
by the executive, the ultra vires model has ramifications for potential efficacy of 
review as a check on executive power. 
If there is no statute creating judicial review, then this suggests that the courts 
did so through the ordinary process of precedent, regardless of their justifications 
for doing so. 97  Further, in the context of imperfect legislative scrutiny it is 
                                                          
95  Law Commission, above n 10, at [2.2] 
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dangerous to read too much into what Parliament intends by its (non-)addressing of 
an issue. Not only that, intentions that could be inferred are given life by judicial 
officers.98 Should it be shown that review is a common law development, as I 
believe it to be, then the argument for caution is strengthened somewhat. Attitudes 
of comity would suggest that Parliament should not second-guess courts’ decisions 
to use review as a vehicle for the judicial function of upholding the rule of law. 
Thus, a common law review power would speak against Parliamentary regulation. 
Accordingly, the origins of review affect the appropriateness of its reform by 
statute.  
Judicial review’s status as part of the inherent jurisdiction of the courts is not 
necessarily enough to avoid the reply that Parliament can make any law it wishes, 
including to exclude review. In that sense there is little legal difference between 
modified ultra vires review and weak illegality review; judicial review can still be 
the plaything of Parliament. But it leaves open the possibility of strong illegality of 
review endorsed by Allan and later consequential challenges against legislative 
sovereignty. 99  Although I do not necessarily endorse orthodox conceptions of 
Parliamentary sovereignty, now is not the time to challenge them either.  
The major advantage of parliamentary caution is that it makes clearer the 
constitutional tightrope Parliament walks when it legislates for the basics. As a 
political rather than legal settlement, it avoids problematic power transfers to the 
courts––but at the cost of not necessarily resolving the underlying theoretical 
problem that Parliament is sovereign.100 Increased scrutiny of the tensions between 
legislature and judiciary may be enough to prevent an abuse of legislative power; 
equally, however, it may simply mean we see the abuses coming more easily. 
Nothing about a convention of deference ensures deference will occur. For now, it 
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suffices to say that judges may not take Parliamentary interference well in all future 
cases.101 
Constitutional uncertainty is the necessary cost of an attempted ‘practical fix’ 
of a problem few in the ordinary public have identified. New Zealand’s 
constitutional culture tends to support leaving the decisions about judicial review 
to Parliament.102 This is a political preference about constitutions that deserves 
recognition. That it makes some uncomfortable in the light of constitutional 
unawareness in New Zealand cannot rob that preference of legitimacy. Geiringer, 
Higbee and McLeay’s ninth principle, that Government has power to create and 
implement policy, is based on an important insight about the different bases of 
power the judiciary and Parliament have.103 The judiciary’s power comes from 
fundamental legal standards and values; whereas Parliament is thought to take its 
power from the desires of the people.104 These different legitimating dynamics 
deserve respect. 
VI What Good Reform May Look Like 
It would be remiss to criticise the Judicature Modernisation Bill’s processes and 
substance without some sort of analysis as to potential legislative alternatives. This 
paper provides one potential solution, but it means a political willingness to cede 
power to legislate for judicial review. I argue that Parliament should provide that 
judicial review exists, and leave the common law to its own devices. So far, I have 
established the importance of judicial review, and why Parliament should therefore 
be careful not to break it. As one of the pre-eminent tools in the public law space, 
it remains a multifaceted and useful––if sporadic––tool used to protect 
administrative process from governmental overreach. 105  Frequently, it is a 
safeguard against simple executive mistake.  
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More importantly, the common law nature of review is politically significant. It 
is in line with some more modern notions of sovereignty that diffuse power amongst 
the different organs of government.106 Nor does it limit the possibility of constituent 
power in the way the ultra vires model, by conforming to traditional ideals of 
sovereignty-as-command, does. 107  But, more practically, widespread 
acknowledgment of the court’s role in creating review demands greater respect for 
the opinions of court officials; there is a greater moral mandate for them to defend 
review from parliamentary interference. Such encouragement of co-operative 
behaviour from Parliament when it legislates for review promotes reciprocity and a 
spirit of comity. That is perhaps the real value of common law conceptions of 
review: it encourages Parliament to share its power, and to use that power more 
cautiously. 
A Taking judicial review procedure out of the statute 
It is clear that to some degree the Judicature Modernisation Bill neglected 
needed reforms of judicial review procedure. For instance, jurisdictional problems 
in case law on the Judicature Amendment Act remain unresolved.108 The courts 
sometimes neglect to analyse the suitability of applying public law norms. It is not 
the law that the hypothetical perfectly private incorporated society is subject to 
review for the mere misuse of a power under its instruments of incorporation. What 
constitutes a reviewable decision in the courts is conceptually difficult, but it is clear 
that publicness is essential; 109  and reform of the statutory procedure may be 
necessary to make that clear. Even if the exact distinction is ill-defined, that the law 
should not impose public law norms on ‘private’ activity is uncontroversial. 
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Similarly, the question of mandatory orders against the Crown remains undealt 
with.110 Courts still only have the power to declare what the Crown ought to do as 
a result of review proceedings rather than to direct it.111 Perhaps this ought to be 
changed to enhance the functionality of the rule of law. It is not necessarily clear 
why the Crown should avoid liability for poor decisions where there is no public 
policy justification, or how Crown immunity is consistent with the rule of law.112  
Specific remedies to these issues may be achieved through statutory reform, 
whether of the qualification of what constitutes a “statutory power” or to recreate 
an alternative tribunal process for grievances arising out of non-public decisions. 
The potential content of such reforms is not the focus of this paper. Rather, a status-
quo re-enactment has done nothing to resolve these previously identified issues. 
That insight is in itself not new.113 
 Statutory solutions are generally unsuitable for judicial review. Statutory 
drafting, like chess, “requires participants, each time they need to make a decision, 
to consider many relevant factors. Thus, in both activities every move has many 
implications.”114 Given that judicial review is a legal tool of some constitutional 
delicacy, it remains ever-important to implement certain and stable reform. The 
statutory remedies required to reform judicial review would mostly tend to the 
technical and the specific, and are demonstrably unlikely to receive the scrutiny 
they deserve. At least, they are likely to receive a similarly cursory consideration to 
the Judicature Modernisation Bill. Accordingly, there is a chance that any reform 
would be in error. Even if successful, it would be to fix the development of the 
judicial review power in a way that was possibly undesirable.  
Nor is it safe to argue that any problem for judicial review stemming from 
legislative action may be resolved by careful statutory interpretation.115 That relies 
on suitable respect for courts enabling the weathering of any controversy. Instead, 
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our cultural respect for the rule of law is rather weak.116 Thus, where statute is 
ordinarily a “continent with the ocean of common law”, for judicial review statute 
is better to be an atoll.117 
It is worth pursuing an elegant alternative: repeal the procedural elements of the 
Judicature Amendment Act and Judicature Modernisation Bill, and replace them 
with a provision that simply recognises judicial review as existing. The Law 
Commission appeared to be considering this possibility in 2001.118 This solution 
appeals because the development of judicial review procedure is not held hostage 
by the legislature. Furthermore, it is agnostic about what constitutes good review, 
leaving such inquiries to the court on a fact-sensitive basis. Because it leaves the 
development of review outside the power of the legislature, the problems created 
for the rule of law by an inadequate separation of powers are reduced. For this rather 
persuasive reason alone, the courts should be the dominant actors in reform of 
judicial review. 
VII Conclusions 
This paper arose out of an enduring desire for quality law reform. I am reassured 
not to see the errors in the Judicature Modernisation Bill that I initially feared. 
Rather, the Bill is by-and-large a technically competent re-enactment of the 
Judicature Act 1908, including as it relates to judicial review. Curtailment of appeal 
rights is a blot on the record of attempts at non-substantive reform, but in itself is a 
policy decision the Government is entitled to make. Therefore, on the whole, the 
Bill is reasonable. But it is also a Bill passed under dangerously low levels of 
parliamentary scrutiny. As I have shown, assurances that there would be no changes 
whatever are inaccurate. Because of the opaque nature of that lapse, it was not 
immediately obvious what was to be changed for judicial review––not to the wider 
public, at any rate. This is a shame, because these changes needed to be seen. 
                                                          
116  Palmer, “New Zealand Constitutional Culture”, above n 3, at 589. 
117  Legislation Advisory Committee Legislation Advisory Committee Guidelines: Guidelines on 
Process and Content of Legislation (Ministry of Justice, May 2001) at 43. 
118  At 44; the Law Commission review referred to appears to be the one cited above, at n 110. 
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I have discussed the Bill as an example of an attempt at “non-substantive” 
reform of judicial review procedure. Although it is likely to be successful in this 
unambitious target, such an attempt was in the first place misguided due to the 
incomplete protection afforded by a purpose clause. In making that critique I 
advanced an argument for parliamentary caution or deference when legislating for 
constitutional fundamentals, in spite of its legal ability to make any law it pleases. 
A necessary part of such caution is that bills go through proper and thorough 
scrutiny prior to receiving the royal assent. For that reason, omnibus bills are to be 
avoided when passing constitutional legislation. 
Similarly, judicial review maintains its important position in public law because 
it is one of the most prominent means for citizens to enforce their procedural rights 
against the Executive. It is not appropriate that Parliament retains the political 
mandate to legislate away the basis of review proceedings or otherwise restrict their 
availability carte blanche. There is a palpable tension between the rule of law and 
parliamentary sovereignty that must abate. It is unseemly for parliamentarians to 
ask us to rely on their conscience for such fundamentals.  
It is, in the end, a debate about who should have the final word on judicial 
review. When legislating for the constitutional basics, Members of Parliament 
should do so for the right reasons and in the eyes of the public. There needs to be a 
certain regard for the principle of comity and the obligations it imposes on all 
branches of government to respect each other. In particular, since the executive 
largely controls the legislative agenda in practice, the legislative agenda should not 
extend to judicial review of executive action. Good legislative process will 
sometimes necessitate deference. To err too much may earn judicial animosity. If 
the thin veil between law and politics is pierced, the rule of law will likely be the 
first victim. We must avoid such a breakdown in relations. 
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This appendix is intended as a tracing chart. It is only intended to be indicative. 
It should not be relied upon as a conclusive statement of the new legal status and 
placement of each provision in the Judicature Act 1972. Further, the text below is 
only meant to be a brief indication of the substantive content of each section, it does 
not represent any change in language in the modernisation process. Beyond material 
covered in the main text of the paper, no further comment is made as to the 
successful re-enactment of provisions. 
Judicature  
Amendment Act 
Judicature  
Modernisation Bill 
Comments 
  423(1) Purpose of Part to re-enact 
Judicature Amendment Act 
 
  423(2) Reorganisation and 
language changes not to 
have substantive effect 
 
1 Short title    
2(1) Relation to principal Act    
2(2) Date of commencement    
3 Interpretation 424 Interpretation  
  425 Definition of statutory 
power 
Clause 425 is 
reorganised, for 
clarity 
3A Act subject to jurisdiction of 
Employment Court 
427(1) Act subject to jurisdiction of 
Employment Court 
 
  427(2) Act particularly subject to 
certain specific provisions 
of Employment Relations 
Act 2000 
Clause 427(2) newly 
inserted 
4(1) Court may grant any remedy 
claimant is entitled to under 
the writs or declaration or 
injunction, even if appeal of 
decision is available  
436(1) Court may grant any remedy 
the claimant is entitled to 
under the writs or a 
declaration or injunction 
Appeal rights are 
dealt with under 
436(2) 
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4(2) If entitled to declaration a 
decision is ultra vires, the 
Court may instead set aside 
436(2) If entitled to declaration a 
decision is ultra vires, the 
Court may instead set aside 
 
  436 
(3)(a) 
A remedy may be available 
even where appeal of the 
decision is available  
 
4(2A) Absence of duty to act 
judicially will not bar relief; 
this will not modify grounds 
of review 
436 
(3)(b) 
This is available in the 
absence of a duty to act 
judicially 
The proviso in s 
4(2A) is not re-
enacted 
4(3) Discretion to refuse relief 
continued 
438(1) Discretion to refuse relief 
continued 
 
4(4) Section 4(3) does not apply 
to refusals to grant relief for 
bringing wrong type of 
claim 
438(2) Clause 438(1) does not 
apply to refusals to grant 
relief for bringing wrong 
type of claim 
 
4(5) The Court may direct a 
decision-maker to 
reconsider their decision if 
applicant is entitled to relief 
437(1) Section 437 applies where 
the court is satisfied the 
applicant is entitled to relief 
 
 437(2) A direction under 437(3) 
may be as well as or instead 
of an order under cl 436. 
 
  437(3) The Court may direct a 
decision-maker to 
reconsider their decision 
 
  437(4) In giving a direction, the 
Court must give reasons for 
the reconsideration 
 
4(5A) If a direction is given, court 
may make an order per s 8 
with necessary 
modifications 
437(5) If a direction is given, court 
may make order per cl 435 
with needed modifications 
 
4(5B) If a direction is given, 
decision-maker has 
jurisdiction to reconsider 
437 
(6)(b) 
If a direction is given, 
decision-maker has 
jurisdiction to reconsider 
 
4(5C) If a direction is given, 
decision reached previously 
continues to have effect 
subject to s 4(5A) 
437 
(6)(a) 
If a direction is given, 
decision reached previously 
continues to have effect 
unless revoked by the 
decision-maker 
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4(6) If a direction is given, 
decision-maker must have 
regard to Court’s reasons 
437 
(6)(c) 
If a direction is given, 
decision-maker must have 
regard to Court’s reasons 
 
5 Court can cure technical 
defects or irregularities in a 
reviewed decision 
439 Court can cure technical 
defects or irregularities in a 
reviewed decision 
Some style changes; 
of no substance 
6 All proceedings commenced 
as writs shall be treated as 
application for review 
431 All proceedings commenced 
as writs must be treated as 
application for review 
 
7 Court may direct 
proceedings for declaration 
and injunction be treated as 
an application for review as 
far as they relate to that 
issue 
432(1) Section applies if (a) 
proceedings are commenced 
for declaration and or 
injunction, with no other 
relief; 
(b) the mis-exercise of 
statutory power is an issue 
in proceedings  
 
  432(2) As far as claim relates to 
432(1)(b), court may treat it 
as an application for review 
 
8(1) Subject to s 8(2), court may 
make certain interim orders 
to preserve position of 
applicant 
435(1) On application of a party, 
the court may make an 
interim order to protect the 
party’s position 
 
  435(2) [interim orders defined]  
8(2) Interim orders under s 8(1) 
do not bind the Crown to act 
435(3) Interim orders under cl 
435(1) do not bind the 
Crown to act 
 
8(3) Interim orders are made 
subject to terms and 
conditions the Court sees fit 
to impose 
435(4) Interim orders are made 
subject to terms and 
conditions the Court sees fit 
to impose 
 
9(1) Application made by motion 
and statement of claim 
(statement) 
428(1) Application made with 
notice by statement of claim 
 
9(2) Statement to state facts 
forming basis of claim, 
grounds, and relief sought 
 Omitted Should be also in 
High Court Rules 
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9(3) Statement not needed to be 
in terms of proceedings 
mentioned in s 4(1) 
428(3) Statement need not claim 
relief in the nature of writ 
 
9(4) Person whose decision is 
reviewed and, subject to 
s10, all parties to reviewed 
proceedings to be cited as 
respondent 
429(1) 
 
(a) Person whose decision is 
reviewed named as 
respondent; and 
(b) if decision in 
proceedings, all parties are 
named as respondents  
 
  429(4) Clause 429(1)(b) is subject 
to cl 434 
 
9(4A) Where judicial officer’s 
decision is reviewed, they 
are not to be cited; but shall 
file statement of defence 
429(3) 
 
Presiding officer not to be 
cited 
 
 430(2) Presiding officer may 
provide statement defence 
for action under s 429(3) 
 
9(5) Where two people who act 
together under collective 
title reviewed, they shall be 
cited by their collective title 
429(2) Where people act under 
collective title, they must be 
named under that title. 
 
9(6) Subject to s 10, all 
respondents shall file a 
statement of defence 
430(1) Respondent to file defence, 
unless judge directs 
otherwise 
 
9(7) Subject to this part of this 
Act, applications to follow 
rules of Court 
428(2) 
430(3) 
Part 5 of the High Court 
Rules applies as if 
references to parties were as 
respondent and applicant 
 
10(1) Judge may hold conference 
of parties to speed 
resolution of issues 
433(1) Judge may direct that case 
management conference be 
held 
 
  433(2) Purpose is to ensure 
convenient and expeditious 
resolution 
 
  433(3) May be held on application 
of parties or at initiative of 
judge 
 
  433(4) Judge may decide terms on 
which conference to be held 
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10(2) At conference, judge may 
settle issues, give directions 
and orders (…) 
433(5) At conference, judge may 
make any order or direction 
specified in cl 434 
 
  434(2) [orders specified] Minor changes  of 
style  
10(3) Conference not required for 
judge to exercise powers 
under s 10(2) 
434(1) Judge may make orders 
specified in cl 434(2) at or 
before the hearing 
 
 
11 Any party who wishes to 
appeal may do so subject to 
s 66 of principal Act 
440 Appeals made are to cl 57 of 
Judicature Modernisation 
Bill 
See main text of 
article for discussion 
12 [repealed by Judicature 
Amendment Act 1977] 
  Not at issue here 
13 Subject to s 14, this part 
binds the Crown 
426(1) Part to bind the Crown  
14(1) Alters definition of civil 
proceedings in the Crown 
Proceedings Act 1950 
 Omitted Unneeded 
14(2) This part is read subject to 
the Crown Proceedings Act, 
duly amended 
426(2) As part applies to Crown, 
read subject to the Crown 
Proceedings Act 
 
15 Amends s 26(1)(c) of 
principal Act as it relates to 
jurisdiction of 
Administrative Division 
 Omitted Not at issue here 
16 Subject to ss 14–15, 
references in enactments to 
proceedings in s 4(1) read as 
including applications for 
review unless context 
otherwise requires 
441 Each reference in an 
enactment to proceedings 
for the writs is to be read as 
including applications for 
review unless context 
otherwise requires 
 
  442 The Judicature Amendment 
Act is repealed 
 
  443 Transitional provisions  
  444 Consequential amendments 
(schedule 8) 
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